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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
C. EUGENE LARSON, SR., 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
VS 
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICE 
COMPANY, INC., a corporation, 
and NORTHWEST ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
HUGH GARDNER, DONALD H. WAGSTAFF, 
JR., UNIVERSAL DIAMOND REO SALES 
AND SERVICE and UNIVERSAL 
DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 14815 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff, c. Eugene Larsen, 
Sr. from the Judgment entered on the 19th day of July, 1976, by 
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The statement of the disposition in the lower Court 
by Appellant is inaccurate. The Court below ruled in favor of 
the defendants holding that an execution sale conducted in another 
case,which execution sale was the basis upon which the plaintiff 
maintained his action in this matter, was invalid because it did 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not comply with law. Defendants Associates Financial Service 
and Northwest Accpetance are not a party to this appeal. 
Defendant Wagstaff, not having been served with process, is 
likewise not a party to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant, in his brief, has stated, generally, the 
facts of the case. However, except is taken as is noted below. 
At the time of the purported constable's sale of the 
reserves on the 10th day of April, 1974, in the matter entitled 
Larsen v. Universal Diamond Reo Sales & Service (reference to 
transcript of record for documents filed therein are denoted 
R2-~_> civil No. 205417, the constable was served by the 
defendant with a "Notice of ~ack of Jurisdiction of Constable to 
Conduct Sale", which Notice was duly handed to the constable 
prior to the sale. (R2-12) 
Appellant, in his Statement of Facts, alleges that 
"subsequent to said execution sale, Universal Diamond Reo Sales 
& Service • made an assignment of its interest in and to the 
above-described reserves ... ". This is inaccurate. The assign-
ment in question was dated the 21st day of February, 1974, some 
two months prior to the date of the sheriff's sale held on April 
10, 1974, which assignment was duly served upon the Northwest 
Acceptance Corporation on or about February 22, 1974. (R 54-167) 
At the time of trial, the plaintiff-appellant totally 
failed to introduce any evidence whatsoever or elicit any testimony 
with respect to his allegations of fraud on any creditor or that 
there was no consideration for the assignment between Universal 
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Diamond Reo and the defendants Wagstaff and Gardner. 
18, Findings of Fact Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25) 
(R 157, line 
The appellant 
in fact elicited no testimony whatsoever during the trial but merely 
introduced five exhibits and rested his case. Whereupon, defendants 
moved to dismiss the allegations of the complaint based on fraud, 
wrongful transfer, wrongful dissipation of assets and other matters 
contained in the complaint. (R 157-158) 
After the plaintiff had rested his case and defendants' 
motion to dismiss had been submitted to the Court, the appellant 
attempted to supplement his record by attaching to his Memorandum of 
Authorities filed with the Court on August 6, 1976, various documents 
upon which he now relies as being a part of the record. 
The appellant, in his brief, sets forth in part the 
Conclusions of Law made by the Court. However, he omits from his 
brief other conclusions such as is found in Conclusion of Law No. 
3. Conclusion of Law No. 8 wherein the Court found that as a 
matter of law, the plaintiff failed to meet its burden to show 
that the assignment in question to the respondents Wagstaff and 
Gardner was in fraud of creditors or of the plaintiff or void for 
want of consideration, or of Conclusions of Law Nos. 9, 10 and 11 
thereof relating to the failure of plaintiff to put on any 
evidence whatsoever with respect to the allegations of his complaint. 
It is also to be noted that with respect to the defendants, 
Associates Financial Service and Northwest Acceptance Corporation's 
stipulation with the plaintiff, that the same was objected to by 
the respondents and the record shows that they objected to being 
-3-
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bound by the same and to the content thereof. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
{R 151, 152) 
THE EXECUTION SALE CONDUCTED IN CASE NO. 205417 WAS VOID 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Appellant in his brief correctly states the content of 
Rule 69{b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. One of the issues is 
whether or not a constable has the right to conduct a judicial sale. 
Respondent thinks that it is immaterial whether it is a deputy 
constable or the constable himself who conducts the sale. It is 
conceded that the sheriff and constable may operate and function 
through the use of deputies. 
A constable derives his rights and duties strictly by 
statutory authority and this statutory authority has as its basis 
17-25-1 UCA 1953. In the case of Rich v. Industrial Commission, 
80 U. 511, 15 P.2d 641, the Supreme Court of Utah, in a lengthy 
discussion, points out the difference between constables and 
county officers and in particular sheriffs. This case holds that a 
constable has no authority in absence of statute to serve process 
in a civil action. 
No statute of Utah has conferred upon a constable the 
authority to conduct a judicial sale. Rule 69 spells out, without 
equivocation, that where the execution "requires the delivery of 
possession or sale of real or personal property, it must be issued 
to the sheriff of the county where the property or some part 
thereof is situated". {Emphasis ours) 
-4-
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It is conceded that Rule 4(m), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as amended in 1972, confers upon a constable the right 
to serve writs and process, but Rule 4 deals solely with process and 
the service of the same. Judicial sales are confined to Rule 69. 
Had the Supreme Court in the implementation of its Rules 
of Civil Procedure desired to have amended Rule 69, it would have 
done so. In any event, under the holding of Rich v. Industrial 
Commission, it is only by statute that a constable derives his 
rights and powers, and statutory enactments are accomplished by the 
Legislature and not the judicial branch of government. 
It need no cituation that the courts are without authority 
to legislate. This is the prerogative of the Legislature and not 
of the courts, and therefore the holding of Rich v. Industrial 
Commission is still viable as the law of this jurisdiction. 
In the instant case, the writ of execution as issued by 
the Clerk of the District Court was directed to the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County. (R 2-14). The praecipe under which the Sheriff was 
to have acted was likewise directed to the Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County. (R 2-22) At the time of the issuance of this execution, 
the time requirements of Rule 69(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
was not inserted into the writ. The writ shows on its face that it 
was issued on February 5, 1974. However, the purported sale did 
not take place until April 10, 1974, more than two months after 
its issuance. 
Rule 69(c) states: 
"When Writ to be Returned. The writ of execution 
shall be made returnable at any time within two 
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months after its receipt by the officer. It 
shall be returned to the Clerk from which it issue, 
and when it is returned, the Clerk must attach it 
to the record." (Emphasis ours) 
The Supreme Court at the time that it adopted Rule 69{c), 
used the work "shall" in setting forth when the Writ was returnable. 
The word "shall" is usually presumed to be mandatory. State v. 
Zeimer, 10 U.2d 45, 347 P.2d 1111. In the case of Colman v. Utah 
State Land Board (1965), 17 U.2d 14, 403 P.2d 781, 786, the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Callister stated: 
"The word 'shall' is ordinarily considered as 
mandatory and particularly when it is used in a 
statute which is addressed to public officials" 
(Ci ting cases) 
The Sheriff of Salt Lake County is a public official. See: 17-16-2 
UCA 1953. 
In 30 Am Jur 2d 482, Executions, §72, it is stated that 
an execution not returned within the time prescribed by law is void. 
The constable, in making his return, failed to show that 
notice of the sale had been properly posted for not less than seven 
nor more than fourteen days in conformity with Rule 69(e) (1) (2), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein it is provided: 
" (e) Proceedings on sale of property. 
(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property 
on execution, notice thereof must be given as 
follows: 
(2) In case of other personal property, by 
posting a similar notice in at least three 
public places of the precinct or city where 
the sale is to take place, for not less than 
seven nor more than fourteen days." 
The constable in his return failed to state that he had complied 
-6-
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with this prerequisite. (R 168) After submission of the matter to 
the Court, the plaintiff caused to be filed with the Court as a 
part of his legal memorandum an affidavit dated August 2, 1976, by 
the constable alleging that he had in fact complied with the post-
ing requirements. (R 82) Neither this affidavit nor the affiant 
were susceptible to cross-examination by reason of the fact that 
the case had already been submitted to the Court for its deterrnina-
tion. (R 78) Such affidavit is not admissable as part of the 
record and this Court cannot take into consideration such affidavit. 
The matter of the return and deficiency of the same, was 
brought to the attention of the Court during the-trial and at that 
time the plaintiff failed to move for a postponement or continuance 
pursuant to Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or for a new 
trial claiming surprise pursuant to Rule 60(b). Under Rule 43, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Evidence, it is provided in sub-paragraph 
(a) thereof: 
"In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall 
be taken orally in open Court, unless otherwise 
provided by these Rules." 
It has long been held that confrontation and cross-examination are 
basic ingredients of a fair trial and that it is a valuable right 
and it cannot be so constricted as to wholly deprive a party of 
the opportunity to test the credibility of a witness. Crabtree v. 
Measday (1973) 85 N.M. 20, 508 P.2d 1317, 1322. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING ITS CASE BY A 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
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It needs little authority to substantiate the proposition 
of law that a moving party must introduce evidence to prove his 
case. 
In Keesling v. Basamakis (1975) ~- U.2d ~~' 539 P.2d 
1043, the Supreme Court observed: 
"The proponant of a proposition has two 
burdens relative to his proof: to produce evidence, 
which proves or tends to disprove the proposition 
asserted~ and to persuade the trier of fact that 
his evidence is more creditable or entitled to the 
greater weight." (Emphasis the Court's) 
In the matter now before the Court, plaintiff, at the 
time of trial, totally failed and refused to put on any testimony 
or introduce any evidence to substantiate its claims as against the 
named defendant corporation Universal Distributing Company or the 
other named parties, Hugh Gardner or Donald H. Wagstaff, Jr. In 
addition thereto, the plaintiff failed to put on any evidence with 
respect to attempting to show the lack of consideration for the 
assignment by Universal Diamond Reo Sales & Service to Mr. Gardner 
or Mr. Wagstaff. That was his burden. In failing so to do, the 
Court committed no error in making findings of fact and conclusions 
of law that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden. 
In Findings of Fact Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, the 
Court found as a matter of fact that plaintiff failed to introduce 
any evidence or elicit any testimony in substantiation of its 
claims with respect to alleged transfers between the defendant 
Universal Diamond Reo Sales & Service and Universal Distributing 
Company or between defendant Universal Diamond Reo Sales & Service 
and the defendants Wagstaff and Gardner, or that there was any 
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fraud on any creditor or any fraud upon the plaintiff. These were 
the burdens of the plaintiff, and he failed to meet that burden. 
Rule 1(1) (5), Utah Rules of Evidence, 1971. 
The plaintiff, by the devious method of filing a 
memorandum of points and authorities after having rested his case, 
attaching thereto affidavits and documents which should have been 
preferred at the time of trial, has not complied with the funda-
mental rules of evidence and fair play, and therefore this Court 
should out of hand reject matters not properly part of the record. 
POINT III 
A CORPORATION MAY ASSIGN ITS ASSETS EVEN THOUGH ITS 
CHARTER IS SUSPENDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. 
In Point IV of plaintiff's brief, he states that the 
assignment of certain assets to the defendants Wagstaff and Gardner 
was invalid because the corporation had its charter suspended by 
the Secretary of State of Utah at the time of the assignment. 
Plaintiff cites generalized authority but does not deal 
with the fundamental and threshold question of the statutory law 
of Utah relative to this matter. 
Under 16-10-101 UCA 1953, as amended by the Session Laws 
of 1961, it is provided: 
"Continuation of corporate existence to wind 
up after dissolution. - Notwithstanding the dissolu-
tion of a corporation, either (1) by the issuance 
of a certificate of dissolution by the Secretary of 
State, or (2) by a decree of court, or (3) by 
expiration of its period of duration, the corporate 
existence of such corporation shall nevertheless 
continue for the purpose of winding up its affairs 
in respect to any property and assets which have 
-9-
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not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior 
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such 
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and 
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers." 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in Mackay & Knoble Enterprises 
Inc. v. Teton Van Gas, Inc. (1969} 23 U.2d 200, 460 P.2d 828, points 
out that if the corporation which has been dissolved has the right 
to sell or otherwise dispose of real and personal property, sue and 
be sued, after such dissolution for the purposes of winding up its 
affairs, most certainly it has the right to so function while it 
is suspended. 
It has long been the law of Utah that an insolvent 
corporation may prefer one creditor over another. 
Passow & Sons v. Wetherbee, 60 U. 243, 167 P. 350; 
Weyeth Hardware & Manufacturing Co. v. James Spencer Bateman co., 
15 U. 110, 47 P. 640; Burnham Hannah Munger & Co. v. McCornick, 
18 U • 42 t 55 p • 77 • 
In the Passow & Sons case, the Supreme Court observed: 
"We are therefore of the opinion that the only fair 
interpretation which can be placed on the statute 
in question is, that where a corporation has, under 
its provisions, forfeited its charter, in the winding 
up of its affairs and in the disposition of its 
assets, it may make preference, by assignment or 
otherwise, among its creditors, to the exclusion of 
others, so long as not interfered with in a proper 
equitable proceeding for the purpose of subjecting 
its property and assets to the possession of a 
court of equity to be administered upon equally and 
impartially among all of its creditors." 
It must be noted that under 16-10-101 UCA 1953, as amended 
the Legislature did not prescribe a restriction on preference of one 
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creditor over another but granted to the corporation the right to 
sell and dispose of all other property. 
The plaintiff, in its Point IV, raises the question of 
consideration for the assignment to Wagstaff and Gardner. As 
pointed out previously, the plaintiff totally failed to introduce 
any evidence whatsoever with respect to the lack of consideration, 
although he had the opportunity so to do at the time of trial, 
and the court concluded as a matter of law: 
"8. The court concludes as a matter of law 
that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden to 
show that the assignment by the defend~nt Universal 
Diamond Reo Sales & Service to the defendants Wagstaff 
and Gardner was in fraud of creditors, or of the 
plaintiff, or void for want of consideration." 
Plaintiff introduced no documentary evidence whatsoever with respect 
to the assignment nor the assignment itself. 
Plaintiff, in its brief at page 21, under Point V, claims 
that the reserves under this assignment was the sole asset of the 
corporation. The plaintiff misstates its case. This assignment 
did not deal at all with the defendant Associates Financial Service 
Company's reserves, which remained as assets of Universal Diamond 
Reo Sales & Service. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that under the laws of the 
State of Utah, a constable derives his authority solely from 
statutory enactments by the Legislature. 
Under Rule 69, the sole officer authorized to conduct a 
judicial sale is the sheriff of the county wherein property is 
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located. No statutory enactment by the Legislature of this State 
has given such authority to a constable. The case of Rich v. 
Industrial ~ornmission is controlling in this matter. 
It is submitted that the plaintiff totally failed to 
prove its case by the introduction of evidence ro to elicit testimon 
at the time of trial, and therefore cannot now attempt to make a 
record on appeal of matters not introduced into evidence nor 
elicited from testimony by the use of documents filed with the 
court after the matter had been submitted to the court for decision. 
It is respectfully submitted that under the laws of the 
State of Utah, a suspended corporation or a dissolved corporation 
has authority to sell or dispose of its assets, and that it may 
prefer one creditor over another. 
It is submitted that the plaintiff totally failed to 
introduce any evidence or elicit any testimony showing that the 
assignment between the defendants Wagstaff and Gardne~ and the 
defendant Universal Diamond Reo Sales & Service was in fraud of 
creditors, the plaintiff, or lacked consideration. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment in this matter should be sustained 
in their entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
Gardner, Universal Diamond Reo and 
Universal Distributing Company 
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